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It seems a safe assumption, unfortu-
nately, that humanity will persist in
conducting warfare, as evidenced over
all recorded history. New technology
has historically made killing more ef-
ficient, for example with the inven-
tion of the longbow, artillery, armored
vehicles, aircraft carriers, or nuclear
weapons. Many view that each of these
new technologies has produced a Rev-
olution in Military Affairs (RMA), as
they have fundamentally changed the
ways in which war is waged. Many now
consider robotics technology a poten-
tially new RMA, especially as we move
towards more and more autonomous1
systems in the battlefield.
Robotic systems are now widely
present in the modern battlefield, pro-
viding intelligence gathering, surveil-
lance, reconnaissance, target acquisi-
tion, designation and engagement ca-
pabilities. Limited autonomy is also
present or under development in many
systems as well, ranging from the Pha-
lanx system “capable of autonomously
performing its own search, detect, eval-
uation, track, engage and kill assess-
ment functions”2, fire-and-forget muni-
tions, loitering torpedoes, and intelli-
gent antisubmarine or anti-tank mines
among numerous other examples. Con-
tinued advances in autonomy will result
in changes involving tactics, precision,
and just perhaps, if done correctly, a re-
duction in atrocities as outlined in re-
search conducted at the Georgia Tech
Mobile Robot Laboratory (GT-MRL)3.
This paper asserts that it may be pos-
sible to ultimately create intelligent au-
tonomous robotic military systems that
are capable of reducing civilian casual-
ties and property damage when com-
pared to the performance of human
warfighters. Thus, it is a contention
that calling for an outright ban on
this technology is premature, as some
groups already are doing4. Nonethe-
less, if this technology is to be deployed,
then restricted, careful and graded in-
troduction into the battlefield of lethal
autonomous systems must be standard
policy as opposed to haphazard de-
ployments, which I believe is consistent
with existing International Humanitar-
ian Law (IHL).
Multiple potential benefits of in-
telligent war machines have already
been declared by the military, includ-
ing: a reduction in friendly casualties;
force multiplication; expanding the bat-
tlespace; extending the warfighter’s
reach; the ability to respond faster
given the pressure of an ever increasing
battlefield tempo; and greater precision
due to persistent stare [constant video
surveillance that enables more time for
decision making and more eyes on tar-
get]. This argues for the inevitability of
development and deployment of lethal
autonomous systems from a military ef-
ficiency and economic standpoint, un-
less limited by IHL.
It must be noted that past and
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present trends in human behavior in the
battlefield regarding adhering to legal
and ethical requirements are question-
able at best. Unfortunately, humanity
has a rather dismal record in ethical
behavior in the battlefield. Potential
explanations for the persistence of war
crimes include5: high friendly losses
leading to a tendency to seek revenge;
high turnover in the chain of command
leading to weakened leadership; dehu-
manisation of the enemy through the
use of derogatory names and epithets;
poorly trained or inexperienced troops;
no clearly defined enemy; unclear or-
ders where intent of the order may
be interpreted incorrectly as unlawful;
youth and immaturity of troops; exter-
nal pressure, e.g., for a need to pro-
duce a high body count of the enemy;
and pleasure from power of killing or
an overwhelming sense of frustration.
There is clear room for improvement
and autonomous systems may help ad-
dress some of these problems.
Robotics technology, suitably de-
ployed may assist with the plight of
the innocent noncombatant caught in
the battlefield. If used without suit-
able precautions, however, it could po-
tentially exacerbate the already exist-
ing violations by human soldiers. While
I have the utmost respect for our young
men and women warfighters, they are
placed into conditions in modern war-
fare under which no human being was
ever designed to function. In such a
context, expecting a strict adherence to
the Laws of War (LOW) seems unrea-
sonable and unattainable by a signif-
icant number of soldiers6. Battlefield
atrocities have been present since the
beginnings of warfare, and despite the
introduction of International Humani-
tarian Law (IHL) over the last 150 years
or so, these tendencies persist and are
well documented,7 even more so in the
days of CNN and the Internet. ‘Armies,
armed groups, political and religious
movements have been killing civilians
since time immemorial.’8 ‘Atrocity. . . is
the most repulsive aspect of war, and
that which resides within man and per-
mits him to perform these acts is the
most repulsive aspect of mankind’.9 The
dangers of abuse of unmanned robotic
systems in war, such as the Preda-
tor and Reaper drones, are well docu-
mented; they occur even when a human
operator is directly in charge.10
Given this, questions then arise re-
garding if and how these new robotic
systems can conform as well as, or
better than, our soldiers with respect
to adherence to the existing IHL. If
achievable, this would result in a reduc-
tion in collateral damage, i.e., noncom-
batant casualties and damage to civil-
ian property, which translates into sav-
ing innocent lives. If achievable this
could result in a moral requirement ne-
cessitating the use of these systems.
Research conducted in our laboratory11
focuses on this issue directly from a de-
sign perspective. No claim is made that
our research provides a fieldable solu-
tion to the problem, far from it. Rather
these are baby steps towards achieving
such a goal, including the development
of a prototype proof-of-concept system
tested in simulation. Indeed, there may
be far better approaches than the one
we currently employ, if the research
community can focus on the plight of
the noncombatant and how technology
may possibly ameliorate the situation.
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As robots are already faster,
stronger, and in certain cases (e.g.,
Deep Blue, Watson12) smarter than
humans, is it really that difficult to
believe they will be able to ultimately
treat us more humanely in the battle-
field than we do each other, given the
persistent existence of atrocious behav-
iors by a significant subset of human
warfighters?
Why technology can lead
to a reduction in casualties
on the battlefield
Is there any cause for optimism that
this form of technology can lead to a
reduction in non-combatant deaths and
casualties? I believe so, for the follow-
ing reasons.
– The ability to act conservatively: i.e.,
they do not need to protect them-
selves in cases of low certainty of tar-
get identification. Autonomous armed
robotic vehicles do not need to have
self-preservation as a foremost drive, if
at all. They can be used in a self-
sacrificing manner if needed and appro-
priate without reservation by a com-
manding officer. There is no need for
a ‘shoot first, ask-questions later’ ap-
proach, but rather a ‘first-do-no-harm’
strategy can be utilized instead. They
can truly assume risk on behalf of the
noncombatant, something that soldiers
are schooled in, but which some have
difficulty achieving in practice.
– The eventual development and use
of a broad range of robotic sensors
better equipped for battlefield obser-
vations than humans currently possess.
This includes ongoing technological ad-
vances in electro-optics, synthetic aper-
ture or wall penetrating radars, acous-
tics, and seismic sensing, to name but
a few. There is reason to believe in the
future that robotic systems will be able
to pierce the fog of war more effectively
than humans ever could.
– Unmanned robotic systems can be
designed without emotions that cloud
their judgment or result in anger
and frustration with ongoing battlefield
events. In addition, ‘Fear and hyste-
ria are always latent in combat, often
real, and they press us toward fearful
measures and criminal behavior’13. Au-
tonomous agents need not suffer simi-
larly.
– Avoidance of the human psychological
problem of ‘scenario fulfilment’ is pos-
sible. This phenomenon leads to dis-
tortion or neglect of contradictory in-
formation in stressful situations, where
humans use new incoming information
in ways that only fit their pre-existing
belief patterns. Robots need not be vul-
nerable to such patterns of premature
cognitive closure. Such failings are be-
lieved to have led to the downing of an
Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes
in 1988.14
– Intelligent electronic systems can in-
tegrate more information from more
sources far faster before responding
with lethal force than a human possibly
could in real-time. These data can arise
from multiple remote sensors and intel-
ligence (including human) sources, as
part of the Army’s network-centric war-
fare concept and the concurrent devel-
opment of the Global Information Grid.
‘Military systems (including weapons)
now on the horizon will be too fast, too
small, too numerous and will create an
environment too complex for humans to
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direct’15.
– When working in a team of combined
human soldiers and autonomous sys-
tems as an organic asset, they have the
potential capability of independently
and objectively monitoring ethical be-
havior in the battlefield by all parties,
providing evidence and reporting in-
fractions that might be observed. This
presence alone might possibly lead to a
reduction in human ethical infractions.
Addressing some of the
counter-arguments
But there are many counterargu-
ments as well. These include the
challenge of establishing responsibility
for war crimes involving autonomous
weaponry, the potential lowering of the
threshold for entry into war, the mili-
tary’s possible reluctance to give robots
the right to refuse an order, prolifera-
tion, effects on squad cohesion, the win-
ning of hearts and minds, cybersecurity,
proliferation, and mission creep.
There are good answers to these
concerns I believe, and are discussed
elsewhere in my writings16. If the
baseline criteria becomes outperform-
ing humans in the battlefield with
respect to adherence to IHL (with-
out mission performance erosion), I
consider this to be ultimately attain-
able, especially under situational con-
ditions where bounded morality [nar-
row, highly situation-specific condi-
tions] applies17, but not soon and not
easily. The full moral faculties of hu-
mans need not be reproduced to attain
to this standard. There are profound
technological challenges to be resolved,
such as effective in situ target discrim-
ination and recognition of the status of
those otherwise hors de combat, among
many others. But if a warfighting robot
can eventually exceed human perfor-
mance with respect to IHL adherence,
that then equates to a saving of non-
combatant lives, and thus is a human-
itarian effort. Indeed if this is achiev-
able, there may even exist a moral im-
perative for its use, due to a resulting
reduction in collateral damage, similar
to the moral imperative Human Rights
Watch has stated with respect to pre-
cision guided munitions when used in
urban settings18. This seems contradic-
tory to their call for an outright ban on
lethal autonomous robots19 before de-
termining via research if indeed better
protection for non-combatants could be
afforded.
Let us not stifle research in the area
or accede to the fears that Hollywood
and science fiction in general foist upon
us. By merely stating these systems
cannot be created to perform properly
and ethically does not make it true. If
that were so, we would not have su-
personic aircraft, space stations, sub-
marines, self-driving cars and the like.
I see no fundamental scientific barriers
to the creation of intelligent robotic sys-
tems that can outperform humans with
respect to moral behavior. The use
and deployment of ethical autonomous
robotic systems is not a short-term
goal for use in current conflict, typi-
cally counterinsurgency operations, but
rather will take considerable time and
effort to realize in the context of in-
terstate warfare and situational context
involving bounded morality.
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A plea for the non-
combatant
How can we meaningfully reduce hu-
man atrocities on the modern battle-
field? Why is there persistent fail-
ure and perennial commission of war
crimes despite efforts to eliminate them
through legislation and advances in
training? Can technology help solve
this problem? I believe that simply
being human is the weakest point in
the kill chain, i.e., our biology works
against us in complying with IHL. Also
the oft-repeated statement that “war is
an inherently human endeavor” misses
the point, as then atrocities are also
an inherently human endeavor, and to
eliminate them we need to perhaps
look to other forms of intelligent au-
tonomous decision-making in the con-
duct of war. Battlefield tempo is now
outpacing the warfighter’s ability to be
able to make sound rational decisions
in the heat of combat. Nonetheless, I
must make clear the obvious statement
that peace is unequivocally preferable
to warfare in all cases, so this argument
only applies when human restraint fails
once again, leading us back to the bat-
tlefield.
While we must not let fear and igno-
rance rule our decisions regarding pol-
icy towards these new weapons sys-
tems, we nonetheless must proceed cau-
tiously and judiciously. It is true
that this emerging technology can lead
us into many different futures, some
dystopian. It is crucially important
that we not rush headlong into the de-
sign, development, and deployment of
these systems without thoroughly ex-
amining their consequences on all par-
ties: friendly forces, enemy combat-
ants, civilians, and society in general.
This can only be done through rea-
soned discussion of the issues associ-
ated with this new technology. To-
ward that end, I support the call for a
moratorium to ensure that such tech-
nology meets international standards
before being considered for deployment
as exemplified by the recent report from
the United Nations Special Rappor-
teur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Ar-
bitrary Executions.20 In addition, the
United States Department of Defense
has recently issued a directive21 re-
stricting the development and deploy-
ment of certain classes of lethal robots,
which appears tantamount to a quasi-
moratorium.
Is it not our responsibility as sci-
entists and citizens to look for effec-
tive ways to reduce man’s inhumanity
to man through technology? Where
is this more evident than in the bat-
tlefield? Research in ethical military
robotics can and should be applied to-
ward achieving this end. The advent of
these systems, if done properly, could
possibly yield a greater adherence to
the laws of war by robotic systems than
from using soldiers of flesh and blood
alone. While I am not averse to the
outright banning of lethal autonomous
systems in the battlefield, If these sys-
tems were properly inculcated with a
moral ability to adhere to the laws of
war and rules of engagement, while en-
suring that they are used in narrow
bounded military situations as adjuncts
to human warfighters, I believe they
could outperform human soldiers with
respect to conformance to IHL. The end
product then could be, despite the fact
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that these systems could not ever be
expected to be perfectly ethical, a sav-
ing of noncombatant lives and property
when compared to human warfighters’
behaviour.
This is obviously a controversial as-
sertion, and I have often stated that
the discussion my research engenders
on this subject is as important as the
research itself. We must continue to
examine the development and deploy-
ment of lethal autonomous systems in
forums such as the United Nations and
the International Committee of the Red
Cross to ensure that the internationally
agreed upon standards regarding the
way in which war is waged are adhered
to as this technology proceeds forward.
If we ignore this, we do so at our own
peril.
The Way Forward?
It clearly appears that the use of
lethality by autonomous systems is in-
evitable, perhaps unless outlawed by in-
ternational law – but even then enforce-
ment seems challenging. But as stated
earlier, these systems already exist: the
Patriot missile system, the Phalanx sys-
tem on Aegis class cruisers, anti-tank
mines, and fire-and-forget loitering mu-
nitions all serve as examples. A call
for a ban on these autonomous systems
may have as much success as trying
to ban artillery, cruise missiles, or air-
craft bombing and other forms of stand-
off weaponry (even the crossbow was
banned by Pope Innocent II in 113922).
A better strategy perhaps is to try and
control its uses and deployments, which
existing IHL appears at least at first
glance to adequately cover, rather than
a call for an outright ban, which seems
unenforceable even if enacted.
The horse is out of the barn. Un-
der current IHL, these systems can-
not be developed or used until they
can demonstrate the capability of ade-
quate distinction, proportionality, and
shown that they do not produce un-
necessary suffering, and must only be
used given military necessity. Outside
those bounds any individuals responsi-
ble should be held accountable for vi-
olations of International Humanitarian
Law, whether they are scientists, indus-
trialists, policymakers, commanders, or
soldiers. As these systems do not pos-
sess moral agency, the question of re-
sponsibility becomes equated to other
classes of weapon systems, and a hu-
man must always ultimately bear re-
sponsibility for their use23. Until it
can be shown that the existing IHL
is inadequate to cover this RMA, only
then should such action be taken to
restructure or expand the law. This
may be the case, but unfounded pathos-
driven arguments based on horror and
Hollywood in the face of potential re-
ductions of civilian casualties seems at
best counterproductive. These systems
counterintuitively could make warfare
safer in the long run to the innocents in
the battlespace, if coupled with the use
of bounded morality, narrow situational
use, and careful graded introduction.
Let it be restated that I am not
opposed to the removal of lethal au-
tonomous systems from the battlefield,
if international society so deems it fit,
but I think that this technology can ac-
tually foster humanitarian treatment of
noncombatants if done correctly. I have
argued to those that call for a ban, they
would be better served by a call for a
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moratorium, but that is even hard to
envision occurring, unless these systems
can be shown to be in clear violation of
the LOW. It’s not clear how one can
bring the necessary people to the table
for discussion starting from a position
for a ban derived from pure fear and
pathos.
For those familiar with the Martens
clause24 in IHL, a case could be made
that these robotic systems potentially
“violate the dictates of the public con-
science”. But until IHL lawyers agree
on what that means, this seems a dif-
ficult course. I do believe, however,
that we can aid the plight of non-
combatants through the judicious de-
ployment of these robotic systems, if
done carefully and thoughtfully, partic-
ularly in those combat situations where
warfighters have a greater tendency or
opportunity to stray outside Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law. But what
must be stated is that a careful exami-
nation of the use of these systems must
be undertaken now to guide their devel-
opment and deployment, which many of
us believe is inevitable given the ever
increasing tempo of the battlefield as
a result of ongoing technological ad-
vances. It is unacceptable to be “one
war behind” in the formulation of law
and policy regarding this revolution in
military affairs that is already well un-
derway. The status quo with respect
to human battlefield atrocities is unac-
ceptable and emerging technology in its
manifold forms must be used to amelio-
rate the plight of the noncombatant.
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